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Abstract:  In this paper we discuss the  incentives of a welfare maximizing government  to implement strategic trade
policy when there is, on  the one hand, uncertainty about the relevant  market information (like the type of competition,
demand function, cost function, etc.), but,  on the other hand, the environment of the contest between the firms is specific:
there are two firms and the interaction among them is accompanied by technological spillovers from the domestic firm to
the foreign firm. The two bench mark oligopoly modelsS Bertrand and CournotSare assumed to be possible types of market
competition. In order to analyse the problem of  strategic policy under uncertainty, it is first necessary  to work out in  depth
the optimal tariff policy in perfect information setup for both the Cournot and the Bertrand case. We argue, then, that
the"informational" criticism of  strategic trade policy is less relevant than was previously thought. 
Abstrakt: V tomto ￿lánku diskutujeme podn￿ty, které motivují vládu maximalizující všeobecný blahobyt k zavedení
obchodní politiky v situaci kdy relevantní informace o trhu jsou nejisté  (nap˝. typ sout￿æe, poptávková funkce, funkce
náklad￿, atd.), avšak rámec sout￿æení firem je znám: dv￿ firmy, jejichæ vzájemná interakce je doprovázena únikem
technologických informací z domácí sm￿rem k zahrani￿ní firm￿. K modelování  træní sout￿æe jsou pouæity dva základní
modely oligopolu, Bertrand￿v a Cournot￿v. Pro analýzu strategické politiky za nejistoty je nezbytné propracovat do
hloubky optimální tarifní politiku p˝i plné informovanosti v obou t￿chto modelech. Záv￿rem tvrdíme, æe kritika strategické
obchodní politiky op˝ená o nedostatek informací je mén￿ relevantní neæ bylo doposud myšleno.
Key words:  Optimal tariff, Bertrand and Cournot competition, spillovers, strategic trade, government's informational
constraints, social welfare.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Strategic trade policy has its raison d'etre in the circumstances in which imperfect
competition prevails. As is well known, its specific forms hinge on the type of imperfect
competition in the market. In other words, the nature of market interaction among domestic and
foreign firms decisively determines the equilibrium outcome of the game and, in turn, may even
determine the optimal type and the optimal level of a selected instrument (e.g. optimal  subsidy,
quota, tax, tariff, etc.). Thus, for instance, imposing tax on a domestic firm’s output is an optimal
policy if firms compete in prices, whereas subsidising a domestic firm’s output is the proper thing
to do if firms compete in quantities. (See Eaton and Grossman, 1988). What is crucial for the
successful application of a strategic policy seems to be the knowledge of the actors' behavior
(their choice variables and the time structure of their decisions) which allows the government to
properly influence the strategic environment (see Spencer, 1986,  for more on this). However,
new contributions both to oligopoly theory and to strategic trade policy demonstrate that the
informational content needed for intervention is far less demanding than suggested by the early
strategic trade literature. For example, Maggi (1996) showed that both Bertrand and Cournot
outcomes can endogenously arise in a two-stage game in which two firms first set their capacities
and then compete in prices in a market with differentiated goods. The key  parameter (which is
in principle observable) that determines the outcome is the strength of the capacity constraint; if
producing ?beyond capacity” is not so costly (implying that the strength of the capacity constraint
is weak), the Bertrand outcome arises, whereas the Cournot outcome emerges if capacity has a
high commitment value (that is, producing beyond capacities is rather costly). In this framework,
it turns out that so-called capacity and investment polices (like subsidising capacity, R&D, etc)
are much less sensitive to informational content than, for exapmle, output policy,  and government
by conducting such a policy cannot do any harm to domestic social welfare irrespective of the
mode of competition.
One of the motivations of  this paper  is  to show that the informational content  needed2
by government for (harmless) intervention might be much less than a priori expected, even if one
retains all ?unfavourable” assumptions like homogenous goods, output policy and exogenous
mode of competition. The reason for this could be, for instance, the specific situation in which
governments intervene. A government may infer much of the needed information  from the very
structure of  the problem . 
The specific situation which serves to illustrate this point is the one in which  the
international contest between domestic and foreign firms is accompanied by technological
spillovers from the domestic firm to the foreign firm. The spillovers are a by-product of domestic
innovative activity and they are also reflected in the foreign competitor's unit cost. The foreign
firm costlessly, but imperfectly, copies the improvement in production technology. Finally, the
government wants to infer what the optimal level of tariff would be without a apriori knowing
such relevant information as the type of competition between firms, the precise type of R&D
production function, etc.
Prior to discussing the government's strategic trade policy under uncertainty,  it is
necessary to investigate the analogous case of the strategic trade policy in perfect information
framework. That is, to analyse the optimal tariff policy when firms compete in prices rather than
in quantities in the above described circumstances (technological spillovers from the domestic firm
to the foreign competitor) and  when the government possesses all relevant pieces of information.
This analysis is a prerequisite for the more realistic case of  incomplete information.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we set forth the assumptions and describe
the core model and the role of the tariff in the given setup. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of
the third and second stages of the game in the case when the firms compete in quantities. The
impact of  tariff on R&D expenditures, consumer surplus and profit in duopoly and constrained
monopoly is also examined there.  Section 4 is concerned with the central issue S optimal (welfare
maximizing) market structure and optimal tariff in Cournot competition. Sections 5 focuses on
Bertrand competition with the occasional comparison to the results from quantity competition.
Section 6 is again devoted to the main topic S  optimal tariff when firms compete in prices.
Section 7 discusses the important issues of  capabilities and incentives of conducting strategic1It may be useful to think about the domestic firm as "West European" and the foreign firm  as "East European".
2This specification  reflects empirical observations and was listed, for instance, as a "stylized fact" in Dasgupta
(1986), p. 523.
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trade policy when the relevant pieces of  information are not available to the government. Section
8 concludes.
2.  THE MODEL 
2.1.  Assumptions
There are only two countries, "domestic" and "foreign." The market of interest is the
domestic market. The domestic and foreign markets are "segmented markets", that is, the firms
produce for both markets, but they perceive each other's market as different (e.g. the foreign firm
considers the domestic market as different from its own market and, consequently, its
optimization problem for the "home" market is independent of its optimization decision for the
domestic market, the same is true for the domestic firm). In other words, the arbitrage is not
important (because it may be too costly) and no allowances are made for it in the analysis. (See
Brander and Spencer, 1982, 1983 and 1984, and Helpman, 1982). The focus on one market is
also made possible by assuming the constant marginal cost, and thus, avoiding interactions
between markets. 
The domestic firm is the only one assumed to conduct R&D.
1 The focus is on the so-called
"process innovations." An "R&D production function" captures the effects of R&D on unit costs.
The function displays "diminishing returns," that is, every additional dollar invested in decreasing
unit costs results in an ever smaller reduction in unit costs.
2
The nature of the firms' market relationship is modeled by relying on the concept of
strategic interaction. We consider sequential (three-stage) games here. In the first stage, the
domestic government selects the optimal tariff, anticipating the R&D choice of its firm (in the
second stage) and subsequent competition (which may be either in prices or in quantities) between






Finally, we assume that so-called "jumping over the tariff" 
3 is not a viable strategy for the
foreign firm. The reason for this might be that the entry and capacity costs are so high  that
foreign direct investments are not attractive. Alternatively, one can think of the domestic firm as
belonging to a developed market economy and the foreign firm as being from Eastern Europe or
some other less developed country (see Footnote 1),  in which case the export of the goods of the
latter to the former is a usual type of  market interaction. 
2.2. The Core Model
Much like in ￿igi￿ (1996a), (1996b) the core model in this paper is a model of duopolistic
competition between the domestic and the foreign firm. 
The domestic firm has unit costs of production C = a - f(x) where f(x) can be viewed as
an "R&D production function" with classical properties, f(0) = 0, f'(x)>0 and f''(x) < 0.  a is a
parameter that can be thought of as pre-innovative unit costs.
The foreign firm benefits through spillovers from the R&D activity carried out by the
domestic firm. If it exports its products, the foreign firm also pays a specific tariff t per unit of
production. Its unit (pre-tariff)  cost function is c = a - ß f(x) and ß denotes the level of spillovers.
The value of ß can take the values from zero to one, it is perceived as a parameter by the firms,
and is assumed to be common knowledge for both parties.
The inverse demand function of the domestic market (assumed to be linear with units
chosen such that the slope of the inverse demand function is equal to one) is P = A - Q  where
Q = qs+qn and A > a . Parameter A captures the size of the market, whereas qs and qn denote the
choice variables, that is, the corresponding quantities, of the domestic and the foreign firms.
Social welfare (W) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (S) and the firm's profit (p).
The consumer surplus is defined as 5
In the case of a linear demand, the above expression becomes: Sn = (1/2)(qs+qn)
2.
2.3. The Role of Tariff
The economic impact of tariffs has been well established and studied especially in the
international trade literature. One lesson of  strategic trade policy literature is that government has
an incentive to impose a tariff to secure a higher profit or a higher market share for a domestic
firm in a situation in which imperfect competition prevails (e.g., see Brander and Spencer, 1982,
1983, and 1984, Krugman, 1984, Helpman and Krugman, 1989, etc.). The announced tariff
changes the nature of the "game" among foreign and domestic firms by altering the strategic
interactions among them. What is crucial to this result is that the government has the credibility
to commit to its policy choice (e.g. tariff) before the firms make their choices. This requirement
is usually met in practice and it is consistent with our assumption that the government "moves
first" in the game. 
Tariffs seem to be a superior instrument over, say, subsidies  from the point of view of
implementation. Bhattacharjea (1995) discussed several reasons why implementing a subsidy
might be troublesome, from the high information content required to implement the optimal
subsidy to the distorting effects of taxes necessary to finance the subsidy. 
Likewise, the imposition of a tariff is made difficult because of the various bilateral and
multilateral agreements under the former GATT. In this light, imposing a tariff requires a very
strong argument. One such argument arises, for instance, when a foreign firm violates intellectual
property rights. Since the existence of spillovers can be interpreted as violations of intellectual
property rights, the domestic government is authorized to impose a so-called "punitive " tariff.
To justify the introduction of the tariff, we may assume that ß > 0 and interpret this as a violation
of intellectual property rights (see more about the punitive tariff in ￿igi￿, 1996b).   
Another important feature of the tariff is that it is a device by means of which the6
government can influence the market structure. Confining our analysis, for instance, to the
simplest case of two firms and quantity competition, there are three possible market patterns
which could arise in equilibrium as a consequence of the erected tariff: duopoly, constrained
monopoly, and unconstrained monopoly.  In this light, the tariff is a device which controls the
disparity between the domestic firm's and the foreign firm's unit costs. In other words, a
government can, by selecting an appropriate tariff, always raise the tariff so high as to make the
difference in unit costs high enough to force the foreign firm to exit and, depending on the height
of the tariff, enable the domestic firm to charge either the limit price or monopoly price. The
domestic government can instead decide to keep the foreign firm in the market by charging a low
tariff or, if the domestic firm initially holds an unconstrained monopoly position, the desirable
tariff could even be negative (subsidizing imports).  In further considerations, we will neglect the
possibility of negative tariff since it is most likely unfeasible.
Thus, in the case of quantity competition, duopoly will be the viable market form unless
the tariff reaches a certain critical value (labelled "tp") at and beyond which the best response of
the foreign firm will be to exit the market because the domestic firm has adopted strategic
predation strategy as optimal; that is, it has committed to the level of R&D for which the rival
firm's optimal production (as well as profit) is zero. By increasing the tariff beyond tp, the
difference in the marginal costs becomes so large that at (and beyond) the value of the tariff
(denoted by tm), the domestic firm gains an unconstrained monopoly position.
In case of price competition, it is clear that the domestic firm with low costs can,
depending on the height of tariff, be a constrained (Bertrand) or an unconstrained monopolist.
3. THE COURNOT GAME 
3.1. The Case of Duopoly - The Last Two Stages4We neglect the profits the firms are earning on the foreign markets since they are irrelevant to the maximization














When the firms compete in quantities, we assume that duopoly is a viable market form
before the tariff is set. We now start to solve the game backwards.  In the last stage, the firms
choose the equilibrium quantities. The domestic firm maximizes
4
given qs .
The first-order condition for a maximum is Mpn/Mqn = 0 and it yields A - 2qn - q s - C = 0.
The optimization problem for the foreign firm means:
given qn and t (t stands for the tariff imposed by the domestic government). The first-order
condition is:  A - 2qs - qn - c - t = 0.  Solving the reaction functions yields the Cournot outputs
and price as a function of R&D investment:
Substituting (2.a) and (2.b) into (1.a) yields the domestic firm profit function expressed in terms











































In the second stage of the game, the domestic firm selects x in order to maximize its profit.
Note that the set of R&D action is given by X where xeX = [0,x
q] and x
q is the solution of the
equation a -f(x) = 0.
5 Substituting expressions for C and c into (3) and maximizing with respect
to R&D investment, gives the first order condition and (implicitly) x*c :
       The second-order condition requires :
3.2. The Impact of Tariff on R&D, Profit and Consumer Surplus in Duopoly
We first start with the R&D expenditures. An increase in tariff enhances the R&D
expenditures  if duopoly is a market form in equilibrium. (Duopoly is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for this result to hold.)
LEMMA 1.  dxc
*/dt > 0  if  duopoly is the equilibrium market form in a post-tariff situation.
























since the denominator of (6) is positive as can be seen from comparing it with the second order
condition.
Thus, the role of the tariff here is not only to be a strategic tool to capture the foreign firm
producer surplus, but also to help increase the R&D level towards the socially optimal R&D
expenditures. The intuition for this lies in a specific self-reinforcing mechanism (feedback): an
increase in tariff increases the unit costs of the competitor and leads to the higher output of  the
domestic firm in the new equilibrium. The higher the output, the more it pays off to reduce unit
costs and, therefore, the higher R&D investments will be. Higher R&D investments  enhance cost
advantage and  higher output will follow. 
LEMMA 2. d?*(t)/dt = M?*(t)/Mt > 0 for all t e [0,tp).
PROOF.  First note that d?*(x*c,t)/dt =  M?*(x*c,t)/Mx dx*c/dt + M?*(t)/Mt =  M?*(t)/Mt  since the
first part is zero according to the first order condition. Finally
holds.
LEMMA 3.  dS*(x*c,t)/dt  =  MS*(x*c,t)/Mx dx*c/dt +  MS*(x*c,t)/Mt  where
      MS*(x*c,t)/Mx dx*c/dt >0 and  MS*(x*c,t)/Mt < 0.
PROOF.   First note that                                     



















< 0 for t 0 [0,tp) ‚
As is well known, the direct effect of tariff on consumer surplus is always negative, since
price is higher in the new equilibrium. The indirect effect of the tariff on consumer surplus is,
however, always positive in duopoly, since increases in tariff stimulate investment in R&D  (see
Lemma 1), which in turn increases, output and consumer surplus. Thus, the sign of  dS*(x*c,t)/dt
is a priori ambiguous.
3.3.  The Constrained Monopoly and Strategic Predation 
Strategic predation (or limit pricing) behavior turns out to be the optimal strategy for the
domestic firm in the situation in which, for a given t, predatory profit is equal to or bigger than
the profit in duopoly. Equivalently, this strategy becomes optimal if the imposed tariff reaches or
exceeds a certain critical level (tp). The timing of the game remains the same as before. We refer
here only to the last two stages: in the second to last stage the domestic firm commits to the R&D
level which will force the foreign firm to pick up the zero output in the last stage of the game
(This is the best the foreign firm can do in this situation). In the last stage, two firms are supposed
to compete in quantities, but the best that the foreign rival can do under the given circumstances
is to produce zero quantity and thus exit the market. The domestic  firm, which remains in the
market, then chooses the monopoly output. However, this output (and correspondingly, this
price) is generally different than the output which would result were the domestic  firm to select
the unconstrained monopoly R&D expenditures. 
 The corresponding predatory level of R&D (labelled x*p) is implicitly obtained by
substituting the expressions for C and c into (2b) and equating this expression to zero:6Note that tm = [A -"- (1 - 2 $) f(x*m)]/2 where x*m stands for the R&D investment which an unconstrained

















p /dt ’ &2
(1&2$)f )(x)
< 0 if $ < 1/2.
Solving (9) explicitly for tariff t and labelling  it as "tp" yields:
Tariff tp just suffices to eliminate the competitor from the market and we refer to t e [tp, tm] as a
"predatory tariff"
6. 
Differentiation (9) with respect to t provides us with two important additional lemmas:
LEMMA 4.  dx*p/dt < 0 if ß < 1/2 provided that predation is the optimal strategy for given t, i.e.,
     that the constrained monopoly is the equilibrium market form. 
PROOF.
The question is, however, what caused such a reverse reaction of the domestic firm here
in comparison with its behavior in the duopoly case. (Recall that in duopoly the optimal R&D
increases as a response to an increase in the tariff.)
The answer is not difficult once we understand the logic of "predatory" behavior. When
the domestic firm predates, and there are small spillovers, it spends more resources on innovative
activity than it would if it followed myopic (unconstrained monopoly) profit maximization (see
Appendix 1 for formal proof). In other words, the firm commits to higher R&D to induce the exit
(or prevent the entry) of the rival. An increased tariff yields the same effect. In fact, the
government, by increasing the tariff (assumed to be initially in the predation interval te[tp,tm]),12
predates somewhat for its firm, and it pays for the firm to decrease its R&D expenditure towards
the (monopoly) profit maximizing level of R&D investment after the tariff has been increased.
These considerations, however, bear an important policy implication: a tariff set too high will
decrease R&D spending, decrease output and, as a result, may have a counterproductive
implication for social welfare.
The policy conclusions are exactly reversed in the situation characterized by high
spillovers (ß > 1/2).
LEMMA 5.   dx*p/dt > 0 if ß > 1/2 and predation is an optimal strategy.
PROOF.  Analogous to Lemma 2.
Note that here, the actual level of R&D is lower than the corresponding monopoly R&D
(see Appendix 1) due to the high disincentive of spillovers. An increase in tariff  lessens the 
potential competition of  the foreign firm and reduces disincentives to invest in R&D, and the
optimal response of the profit-seeking firm is to increase the R&D level and thus move again
towards the monopoly (or myopic) profit maximizing point. The policy concern now is not to put
the tariff too low.
Note that the increased tariff in this case also helps to move the R&D closer to the social
optimum and thus, as in duopoly, serves as an "ordinary" policy tool for restoring incentive for
R&D investment.
Furthermore, observe that, at the level of spillovers of one-half (ß = 1/2), the optimal level
of R&D coincides with the "decision theoretical" solution (see Appendix 1). That is, the selected
level of R&D to induce the exit of the foreign firm is the same as if the domestic firm were an
unconstrained monopoly, (tp = tm at ß = 1/2).
What remains to be discussed is the impact of the tariff on predatory profit and consumer
surplus which arises in these circumstances.  The domestic firm selects the R&D investment, x*p,
in such a way as to exclude the foreign firm. Given x*p, the second stage payoff is given by13
Max[Bp]’(A&qp)qp&Cqp&xp . (11)








The first-order condition for a maximum yields, 
Substituting (12) into (11), gives the predatory profit function p
p(x)as a function of predatory
R&D expenditures:
Differentiating  with respect to t, reveals only the existence of the indirect effect, M?
p/Mx dx*p/dt
since the tariff now influences profit only via its impact on R&D expenditures. The sign of M?
p/Mx
dx*p/dt can be easily determined by relying on our previous analysis; when spillovers are low,
dx*p/dt < 0 (see Lemma 4), then  x*p  > x*m , implying  M?
p/Mx < 0 (see Appendix 1) due to over-
investment in  R&D aimed at inducing exit. When, on the other hand, ß  > 1/2 then  x*p  < x*m,
so that dxp/dt > 0 and  M?
p/Mx > 0 (see Lemma 5 and Appendix 1). Thus, as a corollary, we
always have
LEMMA 6.  d?
 p/dt = M?
 p/Mx dxp/dt > 0
Thus, the tariff, irrespective of the level of spillovers, improves the profit of the domestic
firm, since it dampens the strength of the potential competition of the foreign firm and brings the
domestic firm closer to the unconstrained monopoly position.
As far as consumer surplus in the "predation region" is concerned, here also only an
indirect effect of tariff exists and its sign is entirely determined by the spillovers level.
LEMMA 7. dS
p/dt = MS
p/Mx dxp/dt > 0  iff  ß > 1/2  and vice versa is true if ß < 1/2.     
7 A sufficient condition to have optimal positive tariff is a not "too convex" demand function. A linear demand function
surely satisfies this requirement. For a full discussion of the sign of an optimal tariff, see Brander and Spencer (1984).
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Since dx*p/dt > 0  for ß > 1/2 , this implies that dS
p/dt > 0 for ß > 1/2 . By the same token, note
that dS
p/dt < 0 for ß < 1/2 .
An increase in R&D expenditures is always beneficial for the consumer surplus. When
coupled with large spillovers the overall effect is unambiguously positive since an increase in tariff
boosts R&D expenditures in this case. However, when spillovers are small, the optimal reply to
an increase in tariff requires cutting R&D expenditures, thus harming the consumer surplus.
4. OPTIMAL TARIFF IN COURNOT COMPETITION
So far, tariff has been considered as though it were arbitrarily set. However, the
benevolent domestic government wishes to set not just any, but the optimal, welfare maximizing
tariff.
7  So what are the available choices? The social welfare function is represented in a more or
less standard way as the sum of consumer surplus and domestic firm's profit:
Determining the optimal tariff implies the appropriate selection of the optimal (welfare
maximizing) market structure. Recall that we assumed duopoly to be a viable market form in the
pre-tariff situation. Thus, the government has three options: a) to maintain duopoly by charging
a "low" tariff, b) to constrain its firm using the potential competition from abroad by imposing a
tariff which forces the foreign firm to exit the domestic market, but does not enable the domestic
firm to charge full monopoly price and c) to set the tariff so high that it allows the domestic firm
to obtain an unfettered monopoly position.

















It seems that  the government's main problem here is to balance the positive profit effect, M?*/Mt,
against the potentially negative consumer surplus effect (recall the ambiguous sign of dS*/dt), but
since the direct profit effect always exceeds the direct negative consumer surplus effect, the
unambiguous conclusion is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
The optimal tariff, t*, is at least as high as tp. In addition, duopoly is not a welfare
maximizing market structure.
Proof.
The simple sum of the direct profit effect and the direct consumer surplus effect yields: 
Since the indirect consumer surplus effect, MS*/Mx dx*c/dt, is always positive (see Lemma
3), it unambiguously leads to dW*/dt > 0 at the whole range of tariff rates consistent with
duopoly,  that is t0[0, tp].
This result is related to the standard one found in strategic trade theory which claims that,
given the duopoly Cournot competition between the foreign and the domestic firm, imposing a
"low" tariff  is  beneficial  in terms of social welfare under fairly general conditions (see Helpman
and Krugman, 1989). A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this standard result to hold
is that there be "positive terms of trade effect," which in this context means that the new
equilibrium price rises by less than the increase in tariff.  This is surely the case with the linear
demand function.









problem. Positive social welfare effects are not constrained only to "low" (near zero) tariffs  here,
but are also present at a level of  tariff  for which duopoly is not a viable market form. The optimal
tariff argument suggests here that the tariff should be so high that it provokes the expulsion of the
foreign firm. Such a strong result is the consequence of two features of our model. The first
feature stems from the fact that the domestic firm is a "natural monopoly" because of the
increasing returns due to R&D expenditures. Under these circumstances, it is socially optimal to
have only one firm serving the market. In addition, an increase in tariff brings about an increase
in socially desirable investment in R&D activity and then it makes sense to increase the tariff more
than it would otherwise be increased. The second feature is the specification of the social welfare
function. Unlike in the usual strategic tariff scenario, we did not include the revenues from the
collected tariff in the social welfare function. Allowing  for that may change the conclusion of
Proposition 1, in the sense that the duopoly market form might become optimal under certain
circumstances (namely, if R&D efficiency is "small") so that the benefits from tariff revenue would
be higher than the losses from not having more than one firm (with natural monopoly
characteristics) in the market  (see ￿igi￿ 1996b).
The next question which naturally arises in this context is, should the tariff be raised even
higher than the value of  tp. To answer this question, we have to look back at the consumer surplus
and profit functions  in the "predatory" and monopoly region. Since only indirect tariff effects
exist in the predatory region, marginal social welfare is rendered as:
Making use of  Lemmas 6 and 7, it becomes clear that  dW*
P/dt > 0 whenever there are large
spillovers, implying that the tariff should be put at the maximal value, that is, at the level of  tm.
On the other hand, when spillovers are small, there are two conflicting effectsSthe positive profit
effect and the negative consumer surplus effect. However, it can be easily shown (see Appendix
2) that the negative effect always prevails over the positive effect leading to dW*
P/dt < 0 for small
spillovers, which suggests that the optimal tariff stays at tp .  8 Without this assumption the equilibrium price will be p* = min[pm, pb] where "pm" stands for monopoly price.
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Proposition 2.
When spillovers are large (ß > 1/2), the socially optimal tariff  t* =  tm  and the welfare
maximizing market structure is an unconstrained monopoly. When, on the other hand, spillovers
are small (ß <1/2),  tp  is optimal tariff and the constrained monopoly is socially the most
desirable market form.
This strong result again comes from the fact that we ignored the revenue from the tariff.
(Again, if R&D efficiency is rather small, duopoly may  be socially optimal when the revenue from
tariff matters). Furthermore, the fact that the unconstrained monopoly appears as the welfare
maximizing market form is due to the fact that large spillovers produce high disincentive, so that
socially desirable R&D expenditures in duopoly are much lower than in monopoly. The
constrained monopoly cannot be the optimal market form here, since as soon as the erected tariff
reached the level tp, a further increase in tariff would increase both domestic profit and investment
in R&D, which in turn would give rise to an increase  in consumer surplus. Thus, the monopoly
tariff, tm, emerges as optimal. However, the policy conclusion here is not that unfettered
monopoly is unconditionally the best solution. Obviously,  the government may try to use other
instruments (e.g. price caps)  to regulate the monopoly,  provided that this intervention does not
adversely affect R&D.
5. BERTRAND COMPETITION
5.1 Optimal R&D Investment
As far Bertrand competition is concerned, we keep all assumptions adopted in Section 2.
In addition,  we assume, for the time being, that monopoly is not viable for any permissable level
of x or any level of ß  in the pre-tariff situation
8.
As is well known, the lower cost firm will be the only one serving the market with a price
which is slightly below the unit cost of the competitor. 18
pb / p ’ c %t & , (15)
p ’ " & $ f(x) % t. (16)
A(x)’("&$f(x)%t)(A&"%$f(x)&t)&("&f(x))(A&"%$f(x)&t)&x (17)
(A&")f )(x)(1&$)&t(1&2$)f )(x)%2$f(x)(f )(x)&$f )(x)) ’ 1. (18)
2$f )2(x)%f ))(x)(A&"%2$f(x))&(1&2$)f ))(x)t # 0 (19)
Thus, the equilibrium price will be 
where pb refers to Bertrand price. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that e = 0 for the rest of
the paper.
Substituting the expression a -ß f(x) for c in (15) and taking e=0, we get the market price
expressed in terms of R&D expenditures and accompanying parameters:
Similarly, the appropriate substitution gives the profit function, expressed in terms of R&D
expenditures and parameters
where xeX = [0,x
q] and x
q is the solution of the equation a -f(x) = 0.  
In the second stage of the game the domestic firm selects the level of R&D expenditures,
anticipating  subsequent competition in prices. Maximizing (17) with respect to R&D investment,
we obtain (implicitly) x* as the solution of  (18)
     The second order condition requires that                         
and we assume that (19) is always satisfied.
5.2. The Impact of Tariff on R&D, Price,  Profit and Consumer Surplus
The impact of tariff on the equilibrium R&D, depends on the level of spillovers. If
spillovers are low (ß < 1/2), the increase in tariff leads to a decrease in x*, whereas the opposite
holds in a situation in which spillovers are high (ß > 1/2).19
dx
(/dt ’ (1&2$)f )(x)
(1&$)2$f )2(x)%f ))(x)(A&"%2$f(x))&(1&2$)f ))(x)t
.
Sign[dx (/dt] ’ &Sign[(1&2$)] ’ &1 if $ < 1/2
LEMMA 8.  dx*/dt < 0  if  ß < 1/2.
PROOF.  Applying the implicit function theorem to (4), we get
Note that for the denominator to be negative, the second order condition  (18) is sufficient. 
The underlying intuition for these results is analogous to the case of strategic predation
discussed in Section 3. Note that here also x* is higher than the level of R&D which an
unconstrained monopoly would pick up if ß < 1/2.  The increase in tariff raises the unit cost
barrier and moves the domestic firm nearer to the monopolistic position. Thus, the higher tariff,
the closer domestic firm will be to the (unconstrained) monopoly position and its R&D
expenditure will approach  x*m (where x*m is the level of R&D which the profit maximizing
monopoly chooses). This specific situation implies that x* decreases until the tariff reaches the
level tm , that is, the lowest level of tariff which secures the unfettered monopoly position of the
domestic firm.
LEMMA 9.   dx*/dt > 0  if  ß > 1/2.
PROOF.  Analogous to the previous proof.
As should be clear, for ß > 1/2, disincentive to invest in innovative activity is so intense
(high spillovers), that it causes the level of R&D expenditures to be even smaller than x*m. In this
situation an increase in tariff  enables R&D expenditures again to approach the monopolistic R&D
level, but this time, it implies an increase (rather than a decrease) in R&D expenditures. Again,
this result parallels the one from quantity competition if strategic predation (limit pricing) happens
to be the optimal strategy. In this case the increase in tariff also leads to an increase in optimal20
p ( ’ " & $ f(x () % t. (16')
dp (/dt ’ 1 & $ f )(x ()dx (/dt > 1.
R&D for ß > 1/2.
Since price is a central strategic variable here, we will briefly look at the impact of tariff
on equilibrium price. In the standard one-stage Bertrand game, in which the domestic firm has a
post-tariff unit cost advantage, (C < c + t), the pass through of the tariff is 100%, that is, price
increases one-to-one with tariff.
In our model, this is generally not the case. "Overshifting" as well as "undershifting" of
the price is equally possible. The presence of R&D expenditure leads to the indirect effect of tariff
on price, in addition to the "standard" direct effect. The indirect effect of tariff operates via its
impact on optimal R&D expenditures, which, in turn, influences the equilibrium output. Whether
this indirect effect causes an overshifting or undershifting of price, depends upon the level of
spillovers. 
The equilibrium price charged by the domestic firm is 
It is obvious that MP*/Mt = 1, but a change in tariff exhibits an indirect effect via its
influence on the optimal R&D. As we discussed in the previous section, the direction of change
in x* due to the change in tariff depends on whether spillovers are high or low. Relying on these
results, we state two additional lemmas.
LEMMA 10 (OVERSHIFTING).   dp*/dt > 1  if  ß < 1/2.
PROOF.   Differentiating (16') with respect to t yields,
In Lemma 8, we have dx*/dt < 0 for ß < 1/2, implying dp*/dt > 1.
LEMMA 11 (UNDERSHIFTING).   dp*/dt < 1  if  ß > 1/2.
PROOF.  Analogous to the proof for Lemma 10.9 The equilibrium price in the case of Cournot duopoly, is given by P(x) = [ 2 " + A + t - f( x) - $f(x)]/3. As can
be seen by visual inspection, the direct effect of tariff on price is 1/3, whereas the indirect effect is always positive due to
the fact that dxc*/dt > 0 for all $ (see Lemma 1). 
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dA((t)/dt ’ MA((t)/Mt ’ A&"&2t&(1&2$)f(x () > 0 for t 0 [0,tm).
MS ((t)/Mt ’"&A%t&$f(x () < 0 for t 0 [0,tm)
As an aside, note that in the situation in which duopoly competition emerges as an
equilibrium market form, the analogous "direct effect" of the tariff is much smaller, whereas the
indirect effect is always beneficial (price decreasing), thus offsetting, in part, the direct effect.
9
LEMMA 12.   d?*(t)/dt = M?*(t)/Mt > 0 for all t e [0,tm).
PROOF.   First note that d?*(x*,t)/dt =  M?*(x,t)/Mx dx*/dt + M?*(t)/Mt =  M?*(t)/Mt  since the
first part is zero according to the first order condition. Thus,
Substituting the value of tm for t in the above expression, yields d?*(tm)/dt = 0 and for all t < tm
obviously, d?*(t)/dt > 0.
As expected, the increase in tariff softens potential competition and enables the domestic
firm to charge a price which is nearer to the unconstrained  monopoly price.  If the firm were
given a possibility to choose t, they would of course choose tariff tm since monopoly profit is the
biggest one. Recall that for t$tm tariff has no influence on profit, that is d?*(t)/dt = 0 for t $ tm.
LEMMA 13.   dS*(x*,t)/dt  =  MS*(x*,t)/Mx dx*/dt +  MS*(x*,t)/Mt  < 0 for ß < 1/2.
PROOF.   First note that S*(x*,t) = 1/2 q*
2 = 1/2 (A - a + ßf (x*) - t)
2. The sign of MS*(t)/Mt is then
As well known, the direct effect of tariff distortion on consumer surplus is always negative
because of its effect on the price increase. For small spillovers, the negative effect is exacerbated
by the fact that the firm reacts to an increase in tariff  by halting its R&D expenditure (see Lemma
8) and thus  MS*(x*,t)/Mx dx*/dt  is clearly negative as well.22
W[x ((t),t] ’ A([x ((t),t] % S ([x ((t),t].
MA((t)/Mt % MS ((t)/Mt ’ &t&f(x)(1&$) < 0.
dW ((t)/dt ’ MS ((t)/Mx dx (/dt % MS ((t)/Mt % MA((t)/Mt (20)
 However, the overall effect on the tariff  is not known a priori for large spillovers because
an increase in tariff when spillovers are large gives the firm an incentive to invest more in R&D
(see Lemma 9).
6. OPTIMAL TARIFF IN BERTRAND COMPETITION
6.1. The Case when Spillovers are Small (ß < 1/2) 
As in Section 4, the social welfare function, in the case in which the domestic firm selects
x* as its optimal R&D level, is given below
Note that again the set of government strategy actions, T, is defined as T e [0,tm]. 
The shape of  the social welfare function, and thus the optimal tariff, will crucially depend
on the level of spillovers. For small spillovers (ß < 1/2), as we saw in the previous section,
consumer surplus is monotonically decreasing  in t, whereas profit is always (independent of the
spillover level) monotonically increasing in t. Which effect will prevail? A priori economic
intuition would  suggest that an increase in price is generally more harmful to consumers than
helpful for producers, thus we would expect dW*(t)/dt < 0 in this situation. The easiest way to
verify this intuition is to compare the two direct effects ))  M?*(t)/Mt  and   MS*(t)/Mt . Summing
up these two effects gives us 
Since the marginal social welfare is given by
and since MS*(x*,t)/Mx dx*/dt  < 0 (see Lemma 13), it is clear that dW*(t)/dt  <  0. Thus, we have
the corner solution with t*= 0. Maximal welfare is achieved if the tariff is set to zero (or even
negative, if it would be feasible). This is not surprising once we recall the magnification effect
(overshifting) of the tariff on price in the situation when spillovers are small.10The  reason for that is simple; the larger R&D efficiency is, the larger the R&D output for a given R&D effort,
x. The competitor therefore captures more of the R&D output  if  spillovers increase.
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We summarize the above discussion in Proposition 3.
 Proposition 3
If spillovers are low,(ß < 1/2), the optimal tariff, t*, is zero and the optimal market form
is the constrained monopoly. 
6.2. The Case when Spillovers are Large  (ß > 1/2) 
The situation when spillovers are large is much less clear a priori since three scenarios are
possible:
a)  the described "negative direct effect" of the tariff ( MS*(t)/Mt) may still be so strong that it
exceeds the "joint positive effect" (that is  MS*(t)/Mx dx*/dt  + M?*(t)/Mt)  leading again to the
zero tariff in equilibrium.
b)  the joint positive effect outweighs the direct negative effect of the tariff on consumer surplus,
in which case the monopoly tariff, t*= tm, will be optimal and the welfare maximizing market
structure will be an unconstrained monopoly.
c) the joint positive effect  can counterbalance the negative direct effect at some t lying  between
0 and  tm implying  the interior maximum, t* = t e(0, tm).
We  proceed  now to search for the conditions that lead to the optimal tariff different from
zero. As was already mentioned, ß > 1/2 is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for t* ￿
0. In addition to the level of spillovers, the other decisive factor that may crucially affect the
equilibrium value of the tariff could be the level of innovative efficiency [expressed as the intensity
of unit costs reduction and reflected in the values of f(x*) and f '(x*)]. This feature is not
captured explicitly  by the general R&D production function form. The importance of innovative
efficiency comes from the fact that its level would in general affect the incentives to invest in R&D
if  spillovers change. For instance, it is expected that, other things being equal, the change in
spillovers would have a greater impact on R&D investment if R&D efficiency is "larger".
1011 Note that  f(x) = (gx)
1/2  satisfy all the conditions imposed on the general R&D production function, that is,
f(0) = 0, f '(x) > 0,  f ''(x) # 0 and the second order condition is satisfied for this function as well.
12Without loss of generality, we constrain g to be such that g0(0,4).  For g$4 the profit and welfare function are







Consequently, the intensity of the tariff's impact on R&D investment (and thus on the overall
social welfare) will, in turn, depend upon the level of the innovative efficiency.  In particular, one
may expect that an increase in tariff, other things being equal, influences R&D expenditures more
strongly the larger the R&D efficiency is, since the tariff acts as an instrument which restores
incentives to invest in innovative activity  (see Lemma 9). The larger the R&D efficiency, the
stronger the distortions caused by spillovers will be, and the stronger the "recovery" caused by
increase in tariff is expected to be. In terms of Equation (20), this implies that the joint positive
effect can overturn the direct negative effect at some tariff t* = t e(0, tm].  
To account for the important feature of R&D efficiency (and to be more precise about
"low" and "large" R&D efficiency) we introduce the R&D production function in an explicit form.
The particular R&D production function—f(x) = (gx)
1/2—we use here, is the one already
employed  in Chin and Grossman (1990) and ￿igi￿ (1996b). The key  parameter g is aimed at
measuring the above described  R&D efficiency.
11. In addition, we assume that all possible levels
of R&D intensity are in the region between zero and four
12. In this respect, low to middle R&D
efficiency implies g0(0,2) and highly productive R&D activity implies g0[2,4).
6.2.1 Optimal Tariff when f(x) = (gx)
1/2 
Now we are ready to repeat part of our previous analysis in order to explicitly calculate
the optimal tariff. To do this, we simply replace f(x) with (gx)
1/2 . Thus, starting with the first
order condition (18)  we are now able to obtain the explicit level of optimal R&D expenditures:







that the unconstrained monopoly is not a viable option for any level of ß before the tariff is set.
Translated into the present framework,  this implicitly assumes that the R&D intensity is never
high enough to permit the domestic firm to achieve  the unfettered monopoly position in the pre-
tariff situation. However, if R&D intensity is "large" enough and, in turn, spillovers are not that
"big," the domestic firm might be in a position to exercise its unchallenged monopoly power. This
means that the accompanying monopoly price is lower or (at best) equal to the competitor's unit
costs, that is, pm # pb  (where pm  stands for monopoly price).  To prevent this, g  < 2/(1-ß) has
to hold. This requirement reveals several interesting things: first, the unfettered monopoly is not
a viable option if g  < 2; second, the unconstrained monopoly may appear only if g is large (g >
2) and spillovers are low (ß < 1/2). Thus, the initial assumption of the nonsustainability of
monopoly in the preStariff situation implies g  < 2/(1-ß) here. 
Imposing a tariff relaxes the above requirement on g,  since tariff increases the foreign
firm's unit costs. As already  discussed, the level of tariff can increase until it reaches the level at
which (and beyond which) the domestic firm secures its monopoly position.  Since this is the
maximal achievable tariff  which affects domestic welfare, it will certainly be interesting to analyse
when (or if ) this tariff can be imposed by the welfare maximizing  government. To  calculate tm,
all that is necessary is to solve the equality pm = pb+t. The solution of the above equation gives us
The social welfare function expressed in terms of parameters and tariff can now be
obtained by substituting (21) in the general social welfare function with f(x) = (gx)
1/2. (The
function W* is concave and the second order condition is satisfied for all permissable values of







3 / gc($) (22)
Let us for the moment ignore the constrained character of the maximization problem and
solve for t from the first order condition, dW/dt = 0. Denote this solution as t*. The actual
expression for t* from the first order condition yields: 
In order to investigate under which conditions (besides ß >1/2)  the welfare maximizing
tariff is positive, we may simply solve the  inequality  t*> 0. This inequality implies that there
exists a critical value of g (label it gc) such that the optimal tariff is exactly  zero. This  critical
value of R&D efficiency,  gc, is defined by,
such that for g > gc (ß) the optimal tariff is strictly positive (see Fig 1). Equivalently, for any given
g, there exists a critical value ß
c (g) beyond which the optimal tariff is positive. This critical value
is simply obtained by inverting (22).
First note that the sufficient condition for positive t* is  that the spillovers are higher than
the particular value of the spillovers, labelled ß
c* (see Fig 1). Second, for the given value of ß e
(1/2,ß
c*) the value gc tells us how big the R&D efficiency has to be if the combined positive effects
are to overturn the negative one for t* >  0. 
Note that  for a value of spillovers slightly above 1/2, the positive optimal tariff  would
in addition require a very large R&D efficiency. The zone in which we have 0 < t* < tm is labelled
Zone II.  The next step is clearly to verify when t* < tm. In solving this inequality we get the
simple condition  g < 2/ß  (see the border line gm(ß) = 2/ß  in Fig 1).  This defines Zone III.  It is
quite straightforward to check that in Zone III, Wm > W* (where Wm stands for welfare when the
domestic firm is an unconstrained monopolist.). Here we stipulate our last proposition:
Proposition 4.27
The optimal (welfare maximizing) tariff, t*, is positive if g > gc with  f(x) = (gx)
1/2 . If,
in addition,  g > gm , the welfare maximizing market structure will be an unconstrained monopoly
and t*  = tm..
Fig. 1. Optimal tariff, R&D efficiency and the level of spillovers 
Zone I in Fig 1 depicts the area in which the optimal tariff is nonetheless zero. Zone II
yields the positive optimal tariff. As we saw, the level of spillovers  (ß > ß
c* > 1/2) is either rather
large so that it justifies a positive tariff in order to boost the rather low (pre-tariff) level of R&D,
or if spillovers are between  1/2 and ß
c*  then, in addition, the level of  R&D efficiency begins to
matter. The further back from ß
c* we go in the direction of 1/2, the higher the level of innovative
efficiency needed to justify the positive tariff. In Zone III the maximum welfare requires the tariff
tm , which allows for the unchallenged position of the domestic firm. The intuition for the last
result is that the large R&D efficiency coupled with large spillovers represents a substantial
disincentive for socially beneficial investment in innovative activity and the profit maximizing
domestic firm reacts by restricting its R&D activity to a very low level, which is much below the
level an unconstrained monopoly would invest in R&D. In addition, a small increase in tariff  in
this situation is very effective that the increase in R&D investment and output is very strong .
Under these circumstances the small increase in tariff even leads to a fall in equilibrium price, so28
that marginal consumer surplus (dS*/dt >0) is positive. In other words, even if the government
maximizes only consumer surplus, it will pick up tm in these circumstances. Note also that with
no tariff in place, unused R&D opportunities are enormous due to large innovative efficiency.
However, the same caveat concerning the unconstrained monopoly being socially optimal applies
here: Any regulation of that monopoly which does not hamper R&D investment would be
desirable.
7. STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The preceding  analysis was based on the implicit assumptions that governments possess
all the relevant information about types of competition, demand functions, intensity of R&D, and
so on. Under these circumstances government can precisely determine the optimal, welfare
maximizing tariff. However, familiar criticism points to the fact that the relevant pieces of
information are usually not readily available to a given government and then the practical issue
of how strategic policy should be used, or indeed whether it should be used at all, becomes
central. Thus, for instance, it is not difficult  to demonstrate that not knowing  the type of
competition (or better, confusing price for quantity competition) causes  damage (see Eaton and
Grossman, 1988 and  Krugman, 1991, among many others). Therefore, the  critics conclude that
strategic policy has the potential to do such damage that, although it can be useful, it should not
be used in practice. 
Adopting this criticism of informational content, we now assume that the government in
our specific example does not possess relevant pieces of information about costs and demand. It
can only observe (or easily obtain) crude information, such as whether the level of  spillovers are
large or not. Furthermore, the government is assumed to know that the domestic firm is a
technological leader and it can also easily observe whether the firm is alone in the market or not.
Imagine now that government is contemplating whether to impose the tariff or not.  What
can it infer from these crude, but realistic, data? 
There are several possibilities which the government can observe in the pre-tariff  situation
(see  Table 1). First, suppose that the government observes the foreign firm competing in the29
domestic market. If the competition is Bertrand, both firms have to have the same unit costs.
However, since the domestic firm is the technological leader who invests in cost-reducing
technology and it is very likely that it has lower unit costs (unless the spillovers are complete), the
probability of this event is (close to) zero. Therefore, the competitor must be of Cournot type and
the positive tariff is surely beneficial. The level of spillovers gives, in addition, the hint whether
this tariff should be relatively ?low” (tp) or it should be (at least) as high as tm. Imagine now that
the government observes small  spillovers. As is clear from Proposition 1, small spillovers require
Table 1
Inference about the optimal tariff  based on the number of firms observed on the market and 
the observed (low or high) spillover level 
No.of  Firms Observed
on the Market
Small Spillovers:      ß < 1/2 Large Spillovers: ß >1/2
Domestic Firm Only t* = 0 t* Depends Positively on R&D
Efficiency and Spillover Level
Both Firms t* = tp  t* = tm
 
"low" tariffs. Since the government does not have enough information to precisely set up tp, it is
important that in practice the government (if possible) keep increasing the tariff till the moment
when the foreign firm leaves the market. When, on the other hand, spillovers are large, the task
is extremely simple; the government should make sure that the tariff is set so high that it allows
the domestic firm to compete unfettered.
Further, suppose now that the government observes only its firm on the market and  it also
observes small spillovers. In this situation several possibilities may arise: the domestic firm is an
unconstrained monopoly; the domestic firm undertakes strategic predation, selecting the level of
R&D expenditure and output which makes the foreign firm’s entry unattractive; finally, the
domestic firm competes à la Bertrand, has lower unit costs and covers the whole market.
Whichever of these situations is true, (and the government need not know which it is), the optimal
tariff is zero. If the domestic firm is an unfettered monopoly, then the tariff has no impact on the13  It follows from (9) that in the absence of a tariff, predation is not a feasible strategy for $ > 1/2.  Note that from
(9) with t = 0, f(x) = (A-") / (1-2$) is defined only for $ < 1/2. As far as monopoly is concerned, note that p* = [pb,pm] =
[1/2( A+"-f(x)), "-$ f(x)] = "-$ f(x) = p  for $ > 1/2.
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firm’s profit or on social welfare. If the domestic firm predates strategically, or if it picks the
Bertrand price, the optimal tariff is zero once again, since under these circumstances any increase
in tariff would cause a cut in R&D expenditures and a decrease in consumer surplus and, finally,
in  social welfare (see Propositions 2 and 3).
The situation is slightly more complicated when spillovers are large and only the domestic
firm is on the market. In this case, the government knows for sure that there is competition in
prices, since neither unconstrained monopoly nor strategic predations are viable options when
spillovers are large.
13 However, despite the fact that the government can unambiguously infer the
type of competition in this case, it still needs additional information to decide whether to impose
a tariff  at all.  In this situation, the government, has to inquire whether, for instance, spillovers
are very high and/or whether the R&D efficiency of  the domestic firm is large or not. 
8. CONCLUSION
As our analysis has shown, the different types of competition indeed require different
optimal levels of tariff. Thus, Cournot competition always requires a positive tariff, whereas
Bertrand competition usually requires a zero tariff, unless the spillovers are very large and/or
R&D efficiency is rather high. Charging, for instance, a mistakenly positive tariff when there is
a Bertrand competition and low spillovers harms social welfare. In this sense, the traditional
critique of the sensitivity of the level of the optimal instrument to the type of competition is
certainly correct. However, the conclusion that it prevents or discourages the government from
intervening, is not borne out in this specific framework. The government in our case can easily
learn what the optimal tariff might be from the very structure of the problem while having only
crude plausible information like whether spillovers are large or small and how many firms are in
the market. In this sense, our analysis complements  Maggi's (1996), who found in a more general
setting that so-called investment policy (R&D subsides, capacity subsides, etc.) is not harmful31
irrespective of the type of competition. While his result is obtained in a more general framework,
it is on the other hand less powerful (if government made a mistake it would not improve things,
but it would also do no harm) than ours, since the government in our example could, in general
work out the socially beneficial tariff. Since the problems the government faces when deciding
whether to intervene or not are always specific (in the sense that the government may often easely
learn some additional important information from the structure of the situation), our conjecture
is that the "informational" criticism of the strategic trade policy is less relevant than was
previously thought.  In this sense, much like Maggi, we are also cautioning here that our analysis
should not be interpreted in favor of strategic trade policy but as a "...warning that informational
constraints are not likely to remove the individual government's economic incentives on export
policy" (Maggi, 1996, p 253). This is due either to the different type of policy instrument used
(capacity instead of output policy ) or the specific structure of the problem and the possible
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Monopoly profit is given by (A.1.1) 
and is maximized at the value of x*m. Thus, the derivative of (A.1.1) with respect to x is
with 
However, when predation is an optimal strategy, x*m is not feasible and the level of R&D
expenditures x*p  is in general different than x*m. To show this, note that the "predatory price" has
to be such that p = a - ß f(x) + tp holds. Taking this into account, the predatory profit can be
written as
with t = tp. Differentiating  (A.1.4.) with respect to x and evaluating the derivative at  tp gives the
following expression:
Note (by comparing A1.5 with A.1.3) that the value of  (A.1.5) is lower than zero for ß < 1/2
implying  x*p  > x*m  and  that the opposite is true for ß > 1/2 . For ß = 1/2 the two values
coincide, implying xp = xm.33
MS (p/Mx dx (p/dt > 0 for $ > 1/2 ‚ MA(p/Mx dx (p/dt >0 always


























The first part of Proposition 2 is a corollary of Lemmas 6 and 7: 
When spillovers are small, the argument is slightly more subtle due to two conflicting effects,
namely,  MS
*p/Mx dx
*p/dt < 0 for ß < 1/2 but M?
*p/ Mx dx
*p/dt > 0. The sketch of the proof relies on
the analytical expression for the marginal social welfare given by (A.2.1).
The expression (A.2.1) can be viewed as the product of two factors: dx
*p/dt and the remainder.
As was already discussed, when spillovers are large, we know that dW
*p/dt > 0 and by means of
Lemma 5, we also know that dx
*p/dt > 0. This implies that the remaining part of  (A.2.1) is
positive as well. When, on the other hand, ß < 1/2,  Lemma 4 reveals that dx
*p/dt < 0, and since
we now know that the remaining part is  positive, it follows that (A.2.1) is negative, implying  that
the optimal tariff t* = tp.
Appendix 3
Here we compare tp with  tm for both small and large spillovers  where:
If ß < 1/2 Y x*m < x*p Y f (x*m ) < f(x*p)Y  tm  > tp  because the last member of the above
expression, that is, -(1-2ß)f(x) < 0.
If ß > 1/2 Y x*m > x*p Y f (x*m ) > f(x*p)Y  tm  > tp  because now, -(1-2ß)f(x) > 0. 34
Finally, when  ß = 1/2 Y  tm  =  tp  = (A - a)/2.
REFERENCES
Baumol, W., J. Panzar, and R. Willig (1982): Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Braga, C.P. (1990): "The Developing Country Case for and against Intellectual Property 
Protection," in W.E. Siebeck, ed. Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in  
Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature. World Bank Discussion Papers, No  112.
Brandao, A. and A. Fortunato (1997): "Trade Policy and Strategic Interaction," paper presented
at the 24th Annual Conference of the E.A.R.I.E., Leuven, Belgium.
Brander, J. (1986): "Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy," in P.R. Krugman, ed.
Strategic Trade Policy and  the New International Economics. Cambridge,
Massachusetts:  The MIT Press.
Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1984): "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," in H. 
Kierzkowski, ed.   Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 194-206.
Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1981): "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rent under
Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics 14: 371-389.
Chin, J.C. and G.M. Grossman (1990): "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade,"
in R.W.Jones and A.O. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade:
Essays in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.
Coe, D. and E. Helpman (1993): "International R&D Spillovers," NBER Working Paper, 
No.4444, U.S.A.
Dasgupta, P. (1986): "The Theory of Technological Competition," in J.E. Stiglitz and G.F.
Mathewson, eds. New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 519-547.
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz (1980): "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity,"
Economic Journal 90: 266-93.
Deardorff, A.V. (1992): "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica 59: 35-59.
De Bondt, R., P. Slaets, and B. Cassiman (1992) "The Degree of Spillovers and the Number of
Rivals for Maximum Effective R&D," International Journal of Industrial Organization
10: 35-54. 35
Diwan, I. and D. Rodrik (1991): "Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade,"
Journal of International Economics 3: 27-47.
Dixit, A.K. (1980): "The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence," Economic Journal 90: 
95-106.
Dixit, A.K. (1979): "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," The Bell
Journal of Economics 10, 1: 20-32.
D'Aspremont, Jacquemin, A. (1988): "Cooperative and  Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly
with Spillovers," American Economic Review 78: 113-37.
Helpman, E. (1982): "Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and Trade Theory,"  Discussion
Paper No.18-82, Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Tel Aviv University.
Helpman, E. (1993): "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," Econometrica 
61, 6: 1247-1280.
Eaton, J. and G. Grossman (1986): "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics: 383-406.
Helpman, E.and P. Krugman (1989): Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Helpman, E. and G. Grossman (1995): "Technology and Trade," The Handbook of International
Economics  Vol. 3, North-Holland, (forthcoming).
Henriques I. (1990): "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers:
Comment," American Economic Review: 638-640.
Hoffmaster, A. (1995): "North-South R&D Spillovers," CEPR, Discussion Paper, No. 1133.
Kamien, I.M., E. Muller, and Zang (1992): "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," 
American Economic Review 82, 1293-1306. 
 Katz, M.I. (1986) : "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development,"  Rand Journal of
Economics 4: 538-556.
Kierzkowski, H., ed. (1984):  Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Krugman, P.R. (1983): "Import Protection as Export Promotion," in H. Kierzkowski, ed. 
Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 194-206.
Krugman, P.R., ed. (1986): Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Maggi, G. (1996): "Strategic Trade Polices with Endogenous Mode of Competition,"  American36
Economic Review: 237-258.
Mansfield, E. (1994): "Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and 
Technology Transfer,"  IFC Discussion Paper No. 19, The World Bank, Washington,  D.C.
Mansfield, E. (1985): "How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?," Journal of
Industrial Economics, December: 217-223.
Mansfield, E. (1989): "Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries," The
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
McMillan, J. (1982): Game Theory in International Economics. Switzerland: Harwood 
Academic Publisher.
Motta, M. (1992): "Multinational Firms and the TariffSJumping ArgumentSA Game Theoretic
Analysis with some Unconventional Conclusions," European Economic Review 36: 1557-
1571.
Myerson, R.B. (1991): Game Theory - Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard
University Press.
Rapp, R. and R. Rozek (1990): "Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in 
Developing Countries," Journal of World Trade 24 (2): 75-102.
Siebeck, W.E., R.E. Evenson, W. Lesser, and C.A. Primo Braga (1990): Strengthening 
Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature.  World
Bank Discussion Papers, No 112. 
Schmitt, N. (1995): "Product Imitation, Product Differentiation and International Trade," 
Discussion Paper No. 49, CERGE-EI. 
Shapiro, C. (1989): "Theories of Oligopoly Behaviour," in Schmalensee, R., and R. Willig,
eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization.  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 329-410.
Suzamura (1992): "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers,"
American Economic Review 82: 1307-1320. 
Spence, M. (1986): Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance," in  J.E. Stiglitz and
G.F. Mathewson, eds. New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 475-518.
Spencer, B.J, (1986) : "What Should Trade Policy Target?" in  P.R. Krugman, ed. Strategic
Trade Policy and the New International Economic. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press. 
Spencer, B.J. and J.A. Brander (1983): "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"37
Review of Economic Studies 50: 707-722.
Tirole, J. (1991): The Theory of Industrial Organization.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press.
Vishwasrao, S. (1994): "Intellectual Property Rights and the Mode of Technology Transfer,"
Journal of Development Economics 4: 381-402.
￿igi￿, K. (1996a): "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade: The Role of Spillovers,"
CERGE-EI, Working Paper, No 92. 
￿igi￿, K. (1996b): "Optimal Tariff, Spillovers and The North-South Trade," CERGE-EI, 
Working Paper, No 93.
"War of the Worlds" (1994), The Economist, October 1-7, A Survey of The Global Economy,
1-47.   
"The Final Act of the Uruguay Round - Press Summary as of 14. December 1993," The World
Economy, 17, 3, May 1994: 389. 